Abstract: Whistle-blowing has long been a controversial topic encountered by auditing industry. The complex relationship between stakeholders affects the tendency and effectiveness of whistle-blowing. This paper conducted a systemic empirical research on the impact of evidence of wrongdoing and organization structure on auditors' likelihood of whistle-blowing. A survey of 133 professional auditors who attended a national training program was undertaken. The results showed that auditors were more likely to report wrongdoing when the strength of evidence of wrongdoing was strong, and to report externally when the bureaucracy of organization structure was high.
Introduction
Near and Micelli's [1, 2] whistle-blowing model is a theory system that indicates the correlations among characteristics of whistle-blowers, compliant recipients, wrongdoers and their behaviors. In Near and Micelli's study, the tendency of whistle-blowing is affected by the extent to which the effectiveness of whistle-blowing to terminate wrongdoing is high and the compliant recipients' support for whistle-blowing is obvious. Effectiveness of whistle-blowing is influenced by factors such as whistle-blowers' power, evidence strength, and dependence of organization on wrongdoing. [3, 4] When compliant recipients fail to accept whistle-blowing, the likelihood of whistle-blowing will be based on factors such as accounting firms' organization bureaucracy on whistle-blowing, and whistle-blower's compliance with their clients or managers. Therefore, whistle-blowers will consider reporting wrongdoings to external partners. The above interpretations show an interrelation of factors implied in the whistle-blowing process, and we can see how complex the model could be through a causal relationship. Therefore, this model is researchable for several reasons: 1) it helps in understanding the cause-and-effect of whistle-blowing; 2) it shows the relationships among whistle-blowers, compliant recipients, wrongdoers, organizations, and external partners, 3) it gives a hint to auditors to deal with the wrongdoing of their auditing clients. These motivate us to test this model and explore what some other factors are involved and affected, so this study will choose a sub-set of model relating to the bureaucracy and strength of evidence of whistle-blowing to test. This article is organized as follows. First, I will find out the extraneous variables (control variables) that correlate to the likelihood of whistle-blowing (dependent viable). [3, 5, 6] These variables relate to the characteristics of whistle-blowers that will implicitly affect the final results. Second, this study will address the effect of the strength of evidence of the wrongdoing and the organizational structure on the likelihood of whistle-blowing. Third, the interaction impact of the strength of evidence of whistle-blowers and the organizational structure will be discussed.
Research Design
Participates: The research experiment involved 133 professional auditors who attended a national training program. For eliminating the factor of the differences of employee types and auditing working years, all participates were chosen from the training program. There was one incomplete response and 132 valid responses that included 80 females and 53 males. Experiment Design: The experiment is a 3 (organization structure-low bureaucracy, high bureaucracy, high bureaucracy with whistle-blowing procedures) by 2 (evidence of wrongdoing-convincing and unconvincing) between-subjects full factorial design. The experiment materials consisted of a description of general experiment purpose and assurance of confidentiality. All participants were randomly assigned to two experimental groups. The questionnaire contained 3 parts. Part A provided detailed case materials of whistle-blowing. Participants were required to read the materials and answer questions based on it. The case was about an audit senior named Pat Yan who worked at a large accounting firm. He took charge of the audit work of a public traded manufacturing company. By suspecting the company's large revenue amount, he found evidence that the company requested sales return options from retailers who did not actually pay for goods. He reported the wrongdoing to the audit manager, but failed to convince him. He decided to report this to partner in charge. The accounting firm's organization structure was high bureaucracy with whistle-blowing procedures. Questions in Part A related to factors of Pat's report to external parties, audit manager's opinion, strength of evidence, organization structure, costs of Pat's report and external parties' response. The format of questions was 1 to 7 rating scale indicating the degree of participants' response. Part B gave questions about 1) factors to achieve successful career in auditing; 2) actions being taken when whistle-blowers hold different opinions with their managers; 3) compliance with clients' requests. Part C was participants' personal information relating to the research.
Hypotheses Development
The study will discuss the impact of evidence strength and organization bureaucracy on the willingness of auditors' reporting wrongdoings externally to partner in-charge of their accounting firms. The likelihood of reporting wrongdoing externally is dependent variable, the evidence strength and organization bureaucracies are core independent variables, reporting motivations, unsupported complaints and external costs are control variables. [7, 8] propositions of whistle-blowing model, "the whistle-blowers' motives of reporting the wrongdoing can depend on personal characteristics such as altruistic employees, and defining them as snitches or traitors". [9, 10] Although whistle-blowing by employees as a way to ensure ethical conduct of firms is fortified by various statutory rules, [11, 12, 13, 14] employees often discover a wrongdoing, but are not willing to report the wrongdoing. The motives of whistle-blowers are various from one to another, but whistle-blowing should depend on the strength of evidence that the wrongdoing has occurred, not on any individual motives of doing so. One of the motivations of whistle-blowing is on the whistle-blower's loyalty to his supervisors, which means he is less likely to truthfully report the wrongdoing and terminate the occurrence of wrongdoing. This motivation factor have a great impact on the extent of whistle-blowing and their likelihood of whistle-blowing externally when they hold different points of view with their supervisors. The first hypothesis relates to the effect of motives on whistle-blowers reporting wrongdoing.
H1a：A whistle blower is less likely to report externally when he always does whatever his supervisor asks him to do, regardless of the strength of evidence and organizational bureaucracy. Unsupported Complaints: Generally speaking, if the compliant recipient is a core audit manager within the organization, this person must be powerful in decision-making process of whistle-blowing by auditors. [15] If the audit manager agrees that the wrongdoing should be halted, the effectiveness of whistle-blowing is enhanced. However, if this powerful person strongly disagrees with the opinion of the whistle-blower, probably the whistle-blowing is invalid. [16, 17, 18] To continue the whistle-blowing, the complainant is more likely to use external channels so that the wrongdoing is clearly recognized by other institutions in external environment. Based on the proposition of whistle-blowing model by Near and Micelli, if the external institution is powerful in the organization environment, the effectiveness of whistle-blowing will be enhanced and the report of wrongdoing will continue to be considered. This gives a hint to propose that the more seriously the complaint is refused, the more likely the whistle-blower will be to use external channels to continue the whistle-blowing. H1b: A whistle blower is more likely to report externally when his complaint is more seriously refused by the audit manager, regardless of the strength of the evidence and organizational bureaucracy. Costs: If a whistle-blower decides to report the wrongdoing externally, then the cost of this action as another extraneous variable should also be considered. Thus, this minor factor is involved. H1c: A whistle blower is less likely to report externally when the cost of reporting externally is high, regardless of the strength of the evidence and organizational bureaucracy.
Determinants of Whistle-blowing
Evidence of wrongdoing: Whistle-blowers are often asked to provide evidences as the support of the would-be complaints in order to strengthen the credibility and probability of the whistle-blowing that will make the compliant recipient believe that the wrongdoing has occurred. [19] The strength of evidence provided by whistle-blowers are crucial to the successfulness of reporting wrongdoing. [20, 21] In our experiment, Pat reports the wrongdoing by providing some convincing evidences which are the finds of the return options inserted in the sales contracts and the signed side agreements with retailers on the rights of return on unsold inventory. If Pat thinks that his evidence is strong enough to support him in reporting the wrongdoing, although he holds the opposite opinion with his manager, these evidences are still convincing to be used for supporting him to tell the wrongdoing to the engagement partners. According to the propositions written in Near and Micelli's article, the effectiveness of whistle-blowing will be enhanced when the evidence that the wrongdoing has occurred is convincing. The increase in the effectiveness of whistle-blowing may also raise the likelihood of whistle-blowers to report wrongdoing to external partners. H2a: A whistle blower is more likely to report wrongdoing externally when the evidence of wrongdoing is strong, when control variables motivations, unsupported complaints, and costs are concerned. Organizational bureaucracy: The key dimension of the variability of organizations may be the level of bureaucracy. Two conflicting schools of thought appeared regarding the relationship of bureaucratic structure and its impact on the whistle-blowing. The first school of thought proposes that the organizational structure has a negative effect on the whistle-blowing, and this hypothesis is based on resistance to change. [21] In contrast, the second one proposes that organizational bureaucracy would be positively related to the effectiveness of whistle-blowing, only if the formal mechanisms exist to encourage internal whistle-blowing and the organization actually operates consistently with the formalization. [13, 16] The latter principle is consistent with this experiment in which the organization structure of UML is highly formalized and the formal mechanisms of internal whistle-blowing exist. This approach emphasizes the importance of formal channels, thus for those organizations which have clear standards to manipulate the rules, wrongdoings are less possible to occur in their management. In addition, it is difficult to provide strong evidences of the wrongdoings to support whistle-blowings. Once the evidences are not strongly convincing, whistle-blower' report is more likely to be refused by their manager. In this situation, to apply their responsibility to report the wrongdoings and halt them, the whistle-blowers are more likely to report suspected wrongdoings to management partner. Therefore, my second hypothesis is: H2b: A whistle blower is more likely to report externally when the bureaucracy is high, when control variables motivations, unsupported complaints, and costs are concerned. Cross-sectional Determinants of Whistle-blowing: As mentioned in the above hypothesis, the strength of organizational bureaucracy and the evidence of wrongdoing are implicitly related to each other. This relationship can be demonstrated in a 2×3 research design table. If an organization is of relatively low bureaucracy, the evidence of wrongdoing will be more convincing due to the broadly defined rules and procedures on the employee conduct and the ignorance of emphasizing the compliance. Therefore, in this situation the whistle-blowing is most effective. Reversely, if an organization is of relatively high bureaucracy and has the whistle-blowing procedure, the evidence of wrongdoing will be more unconvincing because of the well-performed of the management and whistle-blowing systems. As the result, the whistle-blowing in this situation is least effective. From this experiment involving the high bureaucracy and whistle-blowing system, according to the Near and Micelli's model and the inferences, it can be assumed that the evidence of wrongdoing provided by Pat is unconvincing. It shows a negative tendency between these two organizational predictor variables. 
H3: The level of organizational bureaucracy relates negatively to the strength of evidence of wrongdoing. (Interaction hypothesis) Test and Result Analysis

Correlation analyses:
Before presenting the hypothesis test results, the finding from the correlation analysis and manipulation checks for experiments need to be considered. Correlation analyses between the dependant variables and the control and demographic variables were tested and showed in Table 2 . As shown in Table 2 , the accounting experience was significantly correlated to the likelihood of reporting wrongdoing to the engagement partner by participants and was included in the ANCOVA models as covariates. Other demographic variables like Gender, Age, Work Experience, Present Job, and English did not significantly correlate with the dependent variables and was excluded from the ANCOVA model. The accounting experience which was -.197* (significant at .05 level) negatively related to the likelihood of reporting wrongdoing to the engagement partner by participants. It indicated that the large number of accounting experience would lead the participants less likely to report wrongdoing to the engagement partners. Therefore, it could be concluded that the accounting experience correlated with the likelihood of reporting wrongdoing externally. So this variable should be added as one control variable in the following hypothesis tests. .000
Test Results for Hypotheses on Likelihood of Whistle-blowing Hypothesis 1
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a. R Squared = .478 (Adjusted R Squared = .114) H1 proposes that a whistle blower is less likely to report externally when he always does whatever his supervisor asks him to do, regardless of the strength of evidence and organizational bureaucracy.
To test H1, I used within-subjects' ANCOVA for the dependent variable: likelihood of participants reporting the wrongdoing to managing partner. QA1-3 and QB1-4 are the questions that relate to the auditor obeying what his supervisor asks him to do. As shown in Table 3 , most of the questions are less likely to influence the auditor to report wrongdoing since the p-values are >.05 which means there is no significant correlation between these independent variables and dependent variable. We see only QB3 has a significant correlation with likelihood of reporting wrongdoing to management partner, at F=3.040, p=.006<.05. QB3 are described as: telling the manager that you do not think you are wrong but you will adopt his stand in advising the client. Tell the client that you have a different opinion from the manager. Therefore, I define QB3 as a control variable that relates to dependent variable. H2 proposes that a whistle blower is more likely to report externally when his compliant is more seriously refused by an audit manager, regardless of the strength of evidence and organizational bureaucracy. H3 proposes the costs' effect on likelihood of reporting wrongdoing. To test these 2 control variables, ANCOVA was used on the dependent variable: likelihood of reporting to the managing partner. I included accounting experience as covariates in my analysis when significant correlations were found with the respective dependent variable, as shown in Table 4 . The results showed the values of "How seriously the report is refused" are (F=2.531, p=.026) and costs are (F=2.798, p=.015). Both of these p-value are less than .05, so these are significant. Therefore, the significant levels indicate that how seriously an auditor is refused by his manager and the costs of report have significant effects on the willingness of whistle-blowers to report the wrongdoing to engagement partner. Therefore, the H2 and H3 are supported, and will be used as the control variables to test the hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 4
H4 proposes that a whistle blower is more likely to report wrongdoing externally when the evidence of wrongdoing is strong, when control variables: motivations, unsupported complaints, and costs are concerned. To test this hypothesis, ANCOVA is used on the dependent variable: likelihood of covariates in the analysis, and the significant correlation is found as shown on .000
.997
.002
.034
.587
.009
Hypothesis 5 H5 proposes that a whistle blower is more likely to report externally when the bureaucracy is low, when control variables: motivations, unsupported complaints, and costs are concerned. To test this hypothesis I also use ANCOVA on the dependent variable: likelihood of reporting to the managing partner. How_Serious, and QB3 and accounting experience are included as covariates in the analysis, and the significant correlation is found as shown on Table 6 , F=2.447, p=.030 <.05 which means the result is significantly correlated to dependent variable. Then the effect of reporting the wrongdoing to outside managing partner does not correlate to whether the organizational structure is bureaucratic or not. Therefore, these results provide support for H5.
Hypothesis 6
H6 proposes that the level of organizational bureaucracy relates negatively to the strength of evidence of wrongdoing. This hypothesis is raised to test whether these two variables have interaction effect. Since it is showed as a 2×3 cross tabulation, and these two variables are ordinal, Gamma test is used to check the magnitude of relationship between these two variables. The results shown in Table 7 indicate that the Gamma test significance level is .156, which is greater than .05. Therefore we can conclude that the strength of evidence of wrongdoing does not significantly correlate with whether the organizational structure is bureaucratic or not. The insignificant result shows that there is no interaction effect between these two independent variables, and the collinearity does not exist. These results are provided to reject the H6. 
Summary and Conclusions
Many auditors nowadays may be stuck in a dilemma of whether the wrongdoing is needed to be reported in some situations such as that whistle-blowing is impossible to be accepted by their supervisors, and the organization is refused to change. The factors of influencing the likelihood of reporting wrongdoing are complex. In this study, I test whether evidences of wrongdoing are convincing or not convincing and the strength of bureaucracy of organization structure will impact the likelihood of reporting the suspected wrongdoing. The results show that auditors are more likely to report wrongdoing externally when the strength of evidence of wrongdoing is strong and when the bureaucracy of organization structure is high. The correlation between evidence of wrongdoing and the bureaucracy of organization structure does not exist, which means the two independent variables are not correlative. As discussed in the prior part in this study, at a situation that the whistle-blower holds different opinions with his supervisor (complaint recipient), if the evidence of wrongdoing is strong, the whistle-blower is more confident to report the suspected wrongdoing. Also, if the bureaucracy level is high, the whistle-blowing is more likely to be rejected by his manager; therefore, the whistle-blower will be more likely to report the suspected wrongdoing to the management partner.
